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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to generalize a pair of concepts that are widely used in the
history of science, in art history and in historical linguistics – the concept of internal
and external history – and to replace the often very vague talk of ‘historical narratives’
with this conceptual framework of internal versus external history. I argue that this
way of framing the problem allows us to see the possible alternatives more clearly – as
a limited number of possible relations between internal and external history. Finally,
I argue that while external history is metaphysically prior to internal history, when it
comes to historical explanations, we need both.
‘Examined close up, our history looks rather vague and messy,
like a morass only partially made safe for pedestrian traffic,
though oddly enough in the end there does seem to be a path
across it, that very “path of history” of which nobody knows
the starting point.’ –Robert Musil1
1. Introduction
Here is a very general problem about historiography: what historians
have access to is a series of seemingly unconnected events unfolding
in time. This series of events does not itself provide any historical ex-
planations: it does not say anything about why something happened
or about the significance or lack thereof of specific events. If we want
historiography to be more than just an enumeration of ‘one damn
thing after another’, we need some coherent narrative that would
explain which events were important and which were not and
which events explain which other events.
1 Robert Musil, The Man without Qualities (New York: Random
House, 1995), 390–391.
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This is not a new point. To put this in terms of the Musil quote
above, if we want to find the ‘path of history’ in the ‘vague and
messy morass’ of historical events, we need something more. The
problem is that this ‘something more’ is not so easy to find. The
main candidates of this ‘something more’ have traditionally been
grand historical narratives, like Hegel’s overarching narrative of the
Absolute Spirit coming to its own full realization in the course of
world history. The worry about grand historical narratives is that
they will be too grand to explain the entire series of seemingly uncon-
nected events unfolding in time.
So we have a tension. We need more than ‘one damn thing after
another’. But we need less than grand historical narratives. And it
is not clear how one can carve out an intermediary position. We can
chop up grand historical narratives into smaller, more local historical
narratives,2 but this move would inherit the genuine problems of
fitting seemingly unconnected events into a coherent whole; it simul-
taneously threatens to leave out those events that do not fit neatly into
the narrative (grand or less grand). We can also embrace the ‘one
damn thing after another’ approach and reject all attempts at
finding coherence in them as dangerous and inherently distorting
ideologizing. Or we can embrace the narratives and ignore those
pesky historical events that do not seem to fit – an extreme example
of this would be Hayden White’s approach.3
My aim in this paper is to seek clarity in these questions by gener-
alizing a pair of concepts that arewidely used in the history of science,
in art history and in historical linguistics – the concepts of internal
and external history – and to replace the often very vague talk of ‘his-
torical narratives’ with this conceptual framework of internal versus
external history. I argue that this way of framing the problem
allows us to see the possible alternatives more clearly – as a limited
number of possible relations between internal and external history.
Finally, I conclude that while external history is metaphysically
prior to internal history, when it comes to historical explanations,
we need both.
2 See S. Mannava, ‘Micro-narratives compensating the omission of
grand historical narratives’, Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 158
(2014): 320–325 for a summary.
3 H. White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-
Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). H.
White, ‘The value of narrativity in the representation of reality’, Critical
Inquiry 7 (1980): 5–27. H. White, ‘The question of narrative in contempor-
ary historical theory’, History and Theory 23 (1984): 1–33.
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2. The internal vs. external history distinction generalized
The concepts of internal and external history are used widely in three
historical subdisciplines: the history of science, art history and histor-
ical linguistics. And, to make things a bit more complicated, these
concepts are used somewhat differently in each of these fields.
In art history, the distinction is associated with the work of
Heinrich Wölfflin, who insisted that when writing the history of
art, we need internal history and internal history should be logically
prior to external history. By internal history, he meant the history
of our mental capacities: the history of human vision, of attention,
of imagery. Wölfflin famously held that ‘Vision itself has its history,
and the revelation of these visual strata must be regarded as the
primary task of art history’.4 He later clarified that: by ‘vision’ he
means not only the sheer uptake of visual information, but rather
the complex functioning of our perceptual system and its interaction
with our cognition, which includes attention and mental imagery.
What matters from our point of view is that according to Wölfflin,
we can only write the history of, say, 16th-Century painting if we take
into consideration how people in the 16th Century looked at paintings.
His most explicit statement comes from the chapter entitled ‘The ex-
ternal and the internal history of art’: ‘visual perception is a living
faculty with its own internal history and many phases behind it’.5
This general approach is not specific to Wölfflin and many art his-
torians who would not have wanted to be associated with Wölfflin’s
project could be described as being engaged in the same project inas-
much as they were trying to write the internal history (of how people
in certain periods and region perceived pictures). The most import-
ant example is Michael Baxandall’s book, Painting and Experience
in Fifteenth Century Italy, which discusses how 15th-Century edu-
cated Italians looked at pictures.6 The same attitude is present in
the current ‘postformalist’ approaches, which emphasize the
twofold interactions between the history of artworks (and artifacts
in general) and the history of theways people engaged with, perceived
and created these artworks (and artifacts).7
4 Heinrich Wölfflin, The Problem of the Development of Style in Early
Modern Art (Los Angeles, CA: Getty Research Institute, 1915/2015), 11.
5 Ibid., 305.
6 Michael Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
7 See David Summers, Real Spaces (London: Phaidon 2003); Whitney
Davis,AGeneral Theory of Visual Culture (Princeton: Princeton University
3
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One salient problem with this proposal is that we do not have very
good access to the history of the mental capacities of people who lived
long ago. We cannot merely use the works of art they created (and
looked at) as evidence for making inferences about their mental
states (see Ernst Gombrich’s argument for this in Art and Illusion).
But as Baxandall’s methodology shows, this problem can be
avoided if we pay attention to written sources about how these sub-
jects engaged with artworks.8
The concepts of internal and external history are used very differ-
ently in historical linguistics: there, the internal history of a language
encompasses, for example, the changes in its syntax and grammar,
whereas external history pertains to the full series of events of lan-
guage-users using this language. The external history of a language
is vast: it should include all the events of anyone uttering anything
in this language. Internal history is much more manageable, but, as
in the art historical case, we get an epistemic problem – namely,
that the grammar or syntax of a language are not observable entities
and changes in them are not observable events.
The most philosophically sophisticated discussion of the concepts
of internal and external history emerges in the history of science.
Here, the dilemma is the following: Can the history of scientific
thought be reduced to the history of the utterances and actions of
scientists? Or should we think of the history of scientific thought
as, in some sense, independent from the history of scientists?
If the history of scientific thought is just, or is reducible to, the history
of scientists, then it seems that philosophy of science has little to dowith
the history of science. Itmay (and hopefully does) learn from the history
of science, but philosophy does not (and should not) influence the way
history of science is done. By describing the actions and motives of
scientists, as well as the relevant sociological, institutional and cultural
background, we get a full picture of the history of science. (This ap-
proachwill have little patience for some of the classic topics of the philo-
sophical history of science that dominated the 60s and 70s of the last
century, such as the rationality of theory change.)
Press, 2011); Whitney Davis, ‘Succession and Recursion in Heinrich
Wölfflin’s Principles of Art History’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 73 (2015): 157–64, see also Bence Nanay, ‘The history of vision’,
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (2015): 259–271.
8 See esp. Michael Baxandall, Giotto and the Orators. (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1971) and M. Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth
Century Italy, Chapter 2.
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At the same time, we might think that the history of scientific
thought is (in some sense) independent from the history of scientists.
Taking this route often amounts to interpreting science as a system of
ideas or thoughts that develops according to its own logic. On this
model, we do not have to take into consideration the actual actions
and motives of individual scientists in order to write the history of
science.
This is where the concepts of internal and external history come
in.9 Imre Lakatos takes the external history of science to be a socio-
psychological narrative that describes the utterances and actions of
scientists, together with their institutional background. Internal
history, in contrast, is taken to be a description of the history of scien-
tific thoughts and ideas and of ‘objective scientific growth’.10
According to Lakatos, every event in the history of science has two
descriptions, an internal and an external one. Take the ‘modern syn-
thesis’ of evolutionary biology, for example. The external historian
would examine the various intellectual influences of specific scien-
tists, for example, of Ronald Fischer, Theodosius Dobzhansky,
Ernst Mayr, as well as the interactions between them. The internal
historian, in contrast, would talk about the combination of two scien-
tific theories, Darwin’s theory of natural selection and population
genetics. The specific scientists and their interactions will not play
any role in this latter narrative.11
9 Imre Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the methodology of scientific re-
search programmes’, in: I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds) Criticism and
the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970),
91–195. Imre Lakatos, ‘History of science and its rational reconstruction’,
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (1971): 91–136. Lakatos’s way
of using these terms is highly idiosyncratic (see Lakatos: ‘History of
science and its rational reconstruction’, 123, n. 1; Ian Hacking, ‘Imre
Lakatos’s philosophy of science’, British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science 30 (1979): 381–410, at 394. Ian Hacking, Representing and
Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 122: it is
very different from what intellectual historians mean by internal and exter-
nal history (see Steven Shapin, ‘Discipline and bounding: The history and
sociology of science as seen through the externalism-internalism debate’,
History of Science 30 (1992): 333–369 for a good summary of the many
ways this distinction is used by intellectual historians).
10 I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification’, 180. Note that Lakatos would count the
beliefs and motives of individual scientists as part of external history –
Wölfflin probably would not (see Wölfflin: Principles, 305).
11 Lakatos had an idiosyncratic view on the relation between the in-
ternal and external history of science, which I will return to in Section
5
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We have seen the differences between the ways in which the con-
cepts of internal and external history are used in art history, historical
linguistics and the history of science. On the basis of these, we are now
in a position to zero in on the common denominator in the use of these
concepts and generalize the concept of internal and external history
beyond the scope of these three subdisciplines.
By external history, I mean the sum total of observable events that
took place at a certain place, in a certain historical period, and that are
of a certain kind. So, for instance, the external economic history of
South-East Tanzania in the 1960s is the sum total of observable
events of an economic nature, which that took place in South-East
Tanzania in the 1960s. It is important that external history is the
sum total of all observable events (restricted to a time a place and a
kind) – not just of all observed events. Lakatos’s and Wölfflin’s
concept of external history as well as the one used in historical linguis-
tics all fall under this concept.
In contrast, by internal history, I mean a chain of unobservable
events, where the individual events stand in an explanatory relation
to one another. Wölfflin’s history of vision would qualify as internal
history as would the changes in syntax and grammar that historical
linguists talk about. And Lakatos’s ‘growth of objective thought’
would also count as internal history in this sense. Crucially, the
grand historical narratives of a Hegelian kind would also count as in-
ternal history.
The question I now want to turn to concerns the nature of the re-
lation between internal and external history.
3. The relation between internal and external history
What do historians do? Focus on external or internal history? I take
it to be relatively uncontroversial that they need to focus on both and
the main aim of this paper is to try to understand the relation
between internal and external history. However, in order to do so,
I need to address the possibility of doing without either external
or internal history. I take both of these options to be problematic.
Equating history with external history only and ignoring internal
history altogether would turn historiography into the listing of
5.1. But we do not need to accept his views about the relation between in-
ternal and external history to use the concepts themselves.
6
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meaningless and unconnected events. Even more troublingly, as
external history is supposed to be the history of all observable
events (at a certain period and place of a certain type), historians
will not be in a position to include those events that are observable
but not actually observed. In this sense historians are always in a
fairly hopeless position to write exhaustive external history – even
of the narrowest time period of the smallest location from a very
restricted aspect.
It is not too difficult to find examples for external history of science
that ignore (or pay little attention to) internal history; most historians
working in the tradition of ‘sociology of science’ follow this method-
ology. A famous and extreme example is Bruno Latour and Stephen
Woolgar’s Laboratory Life.12 Latour, who has no training in molecu-
lar biology, spent a couple of years observing the research on growth
hormones in a molecular biology lab at the Salk Institute in San
Diego. In their description of laboratory life, the authors actively
and deliberately ignored the content of the research that was under-
taken in this lab. Similar (but maybe less radical) methodology has
been used in describing more distant episodes in the history of
science.13
The sociological approach to the history of science can be, and has
been, used in more or less radical fashion. The one I have been focus-
ing on here is the more radical version, the one that denies the rele-
vance of internal history.14 One problem with this radical version is
that ignoring internal considerations makes it difficult to describe
what is going on in external history. If a theory T implies a claim
C, then if we describe a scientist who accepts T, it is easy to explain
why she holds C with reference to this piece of internal history. If
we cannot use internal history, then the reason why the scientist
holds C needs to be explained in terms of the scientist’s psychological
history. This will look even more difficult if C is not a claim that the
scientists holds explicitly, but rather a claim she takes for granted
because she (explicitly) accepts T. In this case, internal history can
12 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage Publications, 1979)
13 Another famous example is Steven Shapin, ‘The history of science
and its sociological reconstruction’, History of Science 20 (1982): 157–211.
Shapin, Steven and Simon Schaffer, ‘Leviathan and the Air Pump’,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) for an important theoret-
ical/methodological manifesto for the sociology of science approach.
14 Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life is a good example.
7
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help us to explain why she takes C for granted, but it is difficult to see
how external history alone can do so.
Ignoring external history and equating history with internal
history would lead to similarly implausible results. Given that in-
ternal history is a series of unobservable events, we need to postulate
these events on the basis of something. If they are not postulated on
the basis of observable events (which would be members of the set of
observable events that make up external history), this would lead to a
way of writing history that is completely detached from the data we
have about the place and period the history of which we are trying
to write.
One example for this purely internalist approach is implied by
some evolutionary approaches of scientific change. It has been sug-
gested that, like evolved organisms, scientific theories compete for
survival and reproduction: both science and natural selection
proceed by trial and error. In the same way that we can talk about
natural selection among organisms and lineages, we can talk about
selection among scientific theories. There are various ways of sub-
stantiating this evolutionary analogy.15 But the one that is relevant
for our purposes is the meme theoretical reconstruction of the
history of science.16
15 Some famous examples include Karl R. Popper, The Logic of
Scientific Discovery (London Routledge, 1959/2002); Karl R. Popper,
Conjectures and Refutations (London Routledge, 1963); Karl R. Popper,
Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972); Karl R. Popper, ‘The ra-
tionality of scientific revolutions’, in R. Harré (ed.) Problems of Scientific
Revolutions (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 72–101 (reprinted in Popper: The
Myth of the Framework (London: Routledge, 1996)); Karl R. Popper,
‘Natural selection and the emergence of mind’, Dialectica 32 (1978):
339–355; S. Toulmin, ‘From logical systems to conceptual populations’,
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (1970): 552–564; S. Toulmin,
‘The evolutionary development of natural science’, American Scientist 55
(1967): 456–471; S. Toulmin, Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon,
1972); Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1972), 172; Bas Van Fraassen, The Scientific
Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 39–40; D. L. Hull, ‘A
mechanism and its metaphysics: An evolutionary account of the social and
conceptual development of science’, Biology & Philosophy 3 (1988):
123–155; David L. Hull, Science and Selection, (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2001). See Michael Bradie, ‘Assessing Evolutionary
Epistemology’, Biology & Philosophy 1 (1986): 401–459 for a typology.
16 See D. L. Hull, ‘A mechanism and its metaphysics’; D. L. Hull,
Science and Selection; Robert Aunger, The Electric Meme: A New Theory
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According to this proposal, the history of science, like other cul-
tural phenomena, can be explained, at least partially, with the help
of the following evolutionary model: Memes are pieces of informa-
tion and they compete for survival in a similar way to genes; the
difference is that they compete for mental space. Since the capacity
of the human mind is limited, only some of them, the successful
ones, manage to get into the minds of numerous people, hence,
they survive, whereas the unsuccessful ones die out. A meme can
be a tune, the idea of liberalism, or the habit of brushing one’s
teeth. Those tunes that can get into and stay in many minds will
survive. The ones that fail to do so will die out.17 This general
explanatory model can be applied to the history of science as well:
scientific theories are memes: they spread from the mind of one sci-
entist to the other.
Meme theory in general has been severely criticized,18 but even
if we assume there are such things as memes, even if we also
assume that we can talk about something like selection among
them, the meme theoretical reconstruction of the history of science
will still look problematic. If the history of science can be described
in terms of the selection pressures of meme selection, then scientists
themselves are left out of this process altogether. They are the vehi-
cles of memes at best and the important and explanatory relevant
of How We Think and Communicate (New York: Free Press, 2002); Kate
Distin, The Selfish Meme (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
17 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Second edition, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1976/1989); Richard Dawkins, The Extended
Phenotype (Oxford: W. H. Freeman, 1982); Richard Dawkins: ‘Replicators
and Vehicles’, reprinted in: R. N. Brandon and R. M. Burian (eds) Genes,
Organisms, Populations: Controversies over the Units of Selection (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 1984); Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea
(New York: Touchstone, 1995); Daniel C. Dennett, Freedom Evolves
(New York: Viking, 2003); Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion
as a Natural Phenomenon (New York: Viking, 2006).
18 Dan Sperber, ‘An objection to the memetic approach to culture’ in
Robert Aunger (ed.) Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a
Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). W. C. Wimsatt, ‘Genes,
Memes, and Cultural Heredity’, Biology and Philosophy 14 (1999),
279–310; Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How
Culture Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2005); Kim Sterelny, ‘The Evolution and Evolvability of Culture’,
Mind & Language 21 (2006): 137–165; Kim Sterelny, ‘Memes Revisited’,
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006): 145–165.
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causal relations are to be found among memes, not scientists. If we
take the history of science to be the history of memes, then this
gives us an example of purely internal history that ignores any exter-
nal factors. The history of science, interpreted this way, bypasses
scientists.19
The unsurprising upshot of this is that historians should pay atten-
tion both to internal and to external history. But the real question is
how historians should think about the relation between external and
internal history. And here, I want to distinguish two questions, one
metaphysical and one explanatory. First, we can inquire about the
metaphysical relation between internal and external history. Second,
we can also inquire about the explanatory relation between them.
These two questions are very different and the answer we can give
to them can also be very different.
4. The metaphysical relation between internal and external
history
The first question I want to raise is about the metaphysical relation
between internal and external history. Do both exist? Or should
we consider one of them as a theoretical construct while withholding
claims about its existence. And if both of them exist, should we con-
sider one of them as metaphysically prior? I will argue that there is a
metaphysical asymmetry between internal and external history (but
the nature of this asymmetry very much depends on one’s more
general metaphysical commitments).
From the definition of external history, it follows that external history
exists: it is the sum total of events that exist – they are even observable.
So we can safely assume that external history exists. A trickier question
is whether internal history exists and here it is unlikely that we can
decide this question without bringing in very general and extremely
contested metaphysical assumptions.
Take the internal history that art historians likeWölfflin talk about:
the history of the mental states of people involved in making and con-
suming artworks. To decide whether these mental states are ‘real’ in
some sense would involve getting entangled in old and difficult
debates about the sense in which mental states can be said to exist.
19 Selectionist explanations of scientific change that do not help them-
selves to the concept of meme are also subject to the same criticism. See es-
pecially Stephen Toulmin’s evolutionary account, especially Toulmin,
‘From logical systems to conceptual populations’, 560–564.
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Settling questions about the metaphysics of internal history in the
context of the history of science is even more complicated. Lakatos
clearly believes that the unobservable events of the internal history
of science do exist in the most demanding sense of the term:
The – rationally reconstructed – growth of science [that is, in-
ternal history] takes place essentially in the world of ideas, in
Plato’s and Popper’s third world, in the world of articulated
knowledge which is independent of knowing subjects.20
I will come back to the last sentence where he claims that internal
history is independent from observable events and focus on
Lakatos’s insistence that internal history is part of Popper’s third
world.21 But what does he (or Popper) mean by the third world?
According to Popper, ‘the third world is man-made and, in a very
clear sense, superhuman at the same time. It transcends its
makers’.22 Further, it seems to have causal powers, independent of
the causal powers of the second world.23
In the quote above (and elsewhere) Lakatos seems to equate the
third world with the heaven of Platonic Forms. As he says in one of
his last papers, ‘the third world is the Platonic world of objective
spirit’.24 Elsewhere, however, he takes the third world to be the
world of propositions: ‘the “first world” is that of matter, the
“second” the world of feelings, beliefs, consciousness, the “third”
the world of objective knowledge, articulated in propositions’.25
This neatly demonstrates how difficult it is to settle questions
about the existence of internal history. But luckily we do not
need to do so. If internal history does not exist then there is a
clear metaphysical asymmetry between internal and external
history – the latter exists, whereas the former does not. But if we
assume that internal history does exist, we still get a form of meta-
physical asymmetry. This takes us to the question of whether or
not internal or external history should be considered to be
20 I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification’, 180.
21 Not just in the quoted passage, but also in Lakatos, ‘A postscript on
history of science and its rational reconstruction’, in Imre Lakatos, The
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (eds) John Worrall and
Gregory Currie. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),
189–192 and Lakatos, ‘History of science’, 179.
22 K. Popper, Objective Knowledge, 159.
23 Ibid.
24 I. Lakatos, ‘A postscript’, 128.
25 I. Lakatos, ‘History of science’, 127, footnote 61.
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metaphysically prior. And this again takes us to the hotly debated
terrain of what it means to say that something is metaphysically
prior to something else.
One takewould be to focus on grounding and ask whether internal
history grounds external history or the other way round. Less con-
troversially, one might ask whether internal history supervenes on
external history and whether external history supervenes on internal
history. I take it to be uncontroversial that external history does not
supervene on internal history: if there is a change in external history,
it does not follow that there is also a change in internal history. Even
those who attribute serious importance to internal history (for
example, Lakatos) would be happy to accept this: internal history
abstracts away from some of the details of external history, so
changes in these details will not result in any changes in internal
history. In short, internal history does not supervene on external
history.
But the converse claim is more interesting and more controversial.
Can internal history change without any changes in external history?
If not, then internal history supervenes on external history. I take it
that the standard picture is that internal history supervenes on exter-
nal history, but on the face of it, one might think that this view is not
without opponents.
As we have seen, Lakatos is very clear that internal history is onto-
logically independent from external history. According to him, in-
ternal history is about ‘third world’ entities: entities that are ‘not
dependent in the slightest on the scientists’ beliefs, personalities or
authority’.26 Much of the discussion about Lakatos’s history of
science takes this ontological independence of internal history for
granted, whether or not they side with Lakatos.27
Some defenders of Lakatos’s approach to the history of science
have embraced his claims about the ‘third world’.28 But it is difficult
not to agree with Ian Hacking who writes that these claims about the
ontology of internal history are part of the reason why Lakatos’s
26 Ibid, 106.
27 See, e.g. Y. Elkana, ‘Boltzmann’s scientific research programme and
its alternatives’, in Y. Elkana (ed.) The Interaction between Science and
Philosophy (New York: Free Press, 1974), 242–297, at 245; Tomas Kulka,
‘Some problems concerning rational reconstruction: Comments on Elkana
and Lakatos’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (1977):
325–344, at 331.
28 Notably E. Palmer, ‘Lakatos’s “Internal history” as historiography’,
Perspectives on Science 1 (1993): 603–626.
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entire project has often been treated with suspicion. As Hacking says,
‘Lakatos’s internal history is […], in short, to be a history of Hegelian
alienated knowledge, the history of anonymous and autonomous
research programmes’.29 Hacking’s words may seem strong (espe-
cially in the light of Lakatos’s criticism of Toulmin for his excessive
Hegelian vision of history),30 but some of Lakatos’s early writings
seem to show that Hacking was right. Here is what Lakatos says in
Proofs and Refutations:
Mathematical activity is human activity. Certain aspects of this
activity – as of any human activity – can be studied by psych-
ology, others by history. […] But mathematical activity produces
mathematics. Mathematics, this product of human activity, ‘alie-
nates itself’ from the human activity which has been producing it.
It becomes a living growing organism that acquires a certain au-
tonomy from the activity which has produced it.31
Thinking of objective knowledge as ‘a living growing organism’
sounds Hegelian indeed, but from our point of view the question is
whether it also amounts to denying that internal history supervenes
29 I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 122.
30 Toulmin insisted that evolution should be more than a mere meta-
phor when we describe the progress of science (Toulmin, ‘From logical
systems to conceptual populations’, 560–564). It is not enough to compare
the trial and error method of science to the trial and error method of
natural selection. The evolutionary model is indeed explanatory
(Toulmin, ‘The evolutionary development of natural science’, 470): selec-
tion among scientific theories explains some of the features of these theories,
most importantly, their survival. Lakatos’s main problem with Toulmin’s
account is that this selectionist explanation bypasses scientists and
philosophers, very much like the cunning of Hegelian reason. In other
words, he seems to be criticizing Toulmin for ignoring external history –
something Lakatos himself is often accused of. The most detailed account
of Lakatos’s problems with Toulmin’s evolutionary explanation is in
Lakatos, ‘Toulmin’s Wittgensteinian epicycles’ (manuscript in the
Lakatos archive, file number 8/4). For a shorter summary, see Lakatos,
‘Understanding Toulmin’, Minerva 14 (1976): 126–43 at 137–138. See
also his letter to Jon Cohen, who reviewed Toulmin’s book in the British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science (which Lakatos edited) in 1972.
Lakatos here explicitly agrees with Cohen’s criticism of Toulmin’s
Darwinism, ‘Lakatos to Jon Cohen’, October 22, 1972, Lakatos archive,
file number 13/166.
31 Imre Lakatos, ‘Proofs and refutations’, British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 14 (1963/1964): 1–25, 120–139, 221–243, 296–342 at
146.
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on external history. And I am not aware of any claims by Lakatos that
would have implied that internal history fails to supervene on external
history. In fact, some of his claims suggest the opposite. He insists re-
peatedly, for example, that ‘since external influences always exist,
radical internalism is utopian’.32 In short, it seems that even Lakatos
would admit that there is a metaphysical asymmetry between internal
and external history: internal history supervenes on external history
but not vice versa.
Although Wölfflin has also been accused of being Hegelian,33 he
never explicitly made any claims that would have implied that in-
ternal history would fail to supervene on external history. In fact,
calling internal history a ‘schema’ seems to suggest the opposite.34
And when he says that ‘naturally, we were not able to go about exem-
plifying [internal history] other than by drawing upon the individual
work of art’ [i.e. external history],35 this very much sounds like an
implicit endorsement of the supervenience claim (that is, the claim
that internal history supervenes on external history).
Finally, it is difficult to pin down Hayden White’s idiosyncratic
stance towards historical narratives in this respect. He is very explicit
that internal history (what he calls ‘historical narrative’) is irreducible
to external history.36 But this would be consistent with the claim that
internal history supervenes on external history (as the ‘nonreductive
physicalist’ literature on the supervenience relation in the domain of
mental states shows nicely).37 A charitable interpretation of White’s
writings (especially those in the early 1980s) is that he endorsed
some form of nonreductive monism: he insisted that we, historians,
can ignore the pesky details of external history when we put together
historical narratives (an epistemic claim), but these historical
32 Lakatos, ‘History of science’, 94, see also his tirades against Toulmin,
who he accuses of radical internalism – of what could be rephrased as the
claim that internal history fails to supervene on external history.
33 See especially A. Hauser, Philosophie der Kunstgeschichte (Munich:
Beck, 1958) and also D. Summers, ‘Forms: 19th-Century metaphysics and
the problem of art historical descriptions’, in D. Preziosi (ed.) The Art of
Art History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 127–142 for a
summary.
34 Wölfflin, Principles, 305.
35 Ibid.
36 H. White,Metahistory; H. White, ‘The value of narrativity’.
37 See e.g. Donald Davidson, ‘Mental events’, in L. Foster and
J. Swanson (eds) Experience and Theory (Amherst, MA: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1970), 79–101.
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narratives are nonetheless grounded in external history
(a metaphysical claim).
White’s writings are complex and the strength of his claims shifted
considerably throughout his life. So if someone is not convinced by
this charitable interpretation of his approach as being consistent
with the claim that internal history supervenes on external history
(or if someone doesn’t find this interpretation charitable at all), she
can treat White as an exception. But even in this case, White would
count as an exception inasmuch as he denies that internal history
supervenes on external history. He would nonetheless not deny the
metaphysical asymmetry between internal and external history
given his repeated insistence on the fictionality of historical narratives
and the parallel between literary and historical narratives. He would
still consent to the metaphysical asymmetry between internal and
external history.
5. The explanatory relation between internal and external
history
We have seen that there are good reasons to posit a metaphysical
asymmetry between internal and external history in the sense of the
former supervening on the latter. The question I am now turning
to is whether there is a similar explanatory asymmetry between in-
ternal and external history. The first thing we need to notice is that
metaphysical priority is very different from, and does not imply, ex-
planatorily priority. Just because A supervenes on B and B fails to
supervene on A, this does not mean that B is explanatorily prior to
A. Take mental states again. If we accept that mental states supervene
on physical states, this does not imply that the physical is explanator-
ily prior to the mental – in fact, very few people in that domain would
take the physical to be explanatorily prior.38
I want to argue that the explanatory relation between internal and
external history is twofold. External history is very important to
explain internal history, but, maybe more surprisingly, internal
history also plays a very important role in explaining external history.
38 I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening, 124 alludes to the same
analogy briefly.
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5.1. External history as explanatorily prior
The less controversial claim is that external history plays an import-
ant role in explaining internal history. If we take internal history to be
a theoretical construct that we form on the basis of external history,
then this is obviously so. But even if we do not take internal history
to be a theoretical construct, external history still plays an inevitable
explanatory role, even for those, like Lakatos, who are ardent propo-
nents of the independence of internal history.
According to Lakatos, the first step of writing a history of science
must be the reconstruction of internal history. This is the step
Lakatos calls ‘rational reconstruction’ (Popper also talks about the ra-
tional reconstruction of the history of science; it is unclear who inher-
ited this concept from whom).39 As Lakatos says, ‘whatever problem
the historian of science wishes to solve, he has first to reconstruct the
relevant section of the growth of objective scientific knowledge, that
is, the relevant section of “internal history”’.40 What he means by ra-
tional reconstruction is perhaps more appropriately described as ra-
tional construction: there is no guarantee that the rationally
reconstructed internal history will correspond to the actual historical
facts. Lakatos explicitly acknowledges this: ‘Internal history is not
just a selection of methodologically interpreted facts: it may be, on oc-
casions, their radically improved versions’.41 In other words, rational
reconstruction distorts what we know to be the historical facts and
this gives rise to internal history.42
Lakatos’s writings are full of provocative claims about just how
distorted this internal history will look. Here is the most famous
(or infamous) quote:
Oneway to indicate discrepancies between history and its rational
reconstruction is to relate the internal history in the text and indi-
cate in the footnotes how actual history ‘misbehaved’ in the light of
its rational reconstruction.43
39 See e.g. K. Popper, Objective Knowledge, 179.
40 I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification’, 106.
41 Ibid.
42 See Bence Nanay, ‘Rational reconstruction reconsidered’, The
Monist 93 (2010): 595–615.
43 I. Lakatos, ‘History of science’, 107. Lakatos reiterates this idea about
relegating actual history to the footnotes three times on one page in this same
paper.
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This quote as well as Lakatos’s seemingly dismissive attitude towards
what he calls ‘actual history’ triggered very strong reactions both
from philosophers and historians. Thomas Kuhn writes that ‘What
Lakatos conceives as history is not history at all but philosophy fab-
ricating examples’.44 Or, more precisely,
A historian would not include in his narrative a factual report
which he knows to be false. If he had done so, hewould be so sen-
sitive to the offence that he could not conceivably compose a
footnote calling attention to it.45
Larry Laudan’s reaction is equally strong: according to him,
Lakatos’s methodology is ‘consciously and deliberately falsifying
the historical record’.46 Gerard Holton is even more negative when
he writes about Lakatos’s rational reconstruction of Bohr’s early
work, which he considers to be ‘an ahistorical parody that makes
one’s hair stand on end’.47
Before dismissing Lakatos as a bad historian of science and dis-
missing Lakatos’s vision of history of science as either ahistorical or
crazy, it is important to remember that rational reconstruction for
Lakatos is just the first step of writing history of science. It is not
the end of the story. Internal history is not the finished product,
but only the first, preparatory stage of the historian’s project.
Lakatos is so explicit about this that it is striking howmany historians
and philosophers misinterpret his account.
For Lakatos, the first step of rational reconstruction needs to be fol-
lowed by a second phase where ‘one tries to compare this rational re-
construction with actual history and to criticize both one’s rational
reconstruction for lack of historicity and the actual history for lack
44 T. Kuhn, ‘Notes on Lakatos’, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of
Science 8 (1971): 137–146 at 143.
45 T. Kuhn, ‘Reflections on my critics’, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave
(eds) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), 237–278 at 256.
46 Larry Laudan, Progress and its Problems (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977), 170.
47 Gerald J. Holton, The scientific imagination: Case studies
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 106, see also Gerald J.
Holton, ‘On being caught between Dionysians and Apollonians’,
Daedalus 103 (1974): 65–81 at 75, Noretta Koertge, ‘Rational reconstruc-
tion’, in Robert S. Cohen, Paul K. Feyerabend and Marx W. Wartofsky
(eds) Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976),
359–369, E. McMullin, ‘The history and philosophy of science: A tax-
onomy’,Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (1970): 12–67.
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of rationality’.48 Or, as he reiterates, ‘any rational reconstruction of
history needs to be supplemented by an empirical (socio-psycho-
logical) “external theory”’.49 In short, the history of science is not
identical to its internal history (that is, its rational reconstruction).
Lakatos is not a radical internalist. In fact, he is very much against
radical internalism. As we have seen, he says, ‘since external influ-
ences always exist, radical internalism is utopian’.50 According to
him, writing history of science requires attention to both internal
and external history as well as to the interaction between the two:
‘history of science is always richer than its rational reconstruction’.51
In short, rather than dismissing external history, ‘Lakatos merely
suggests a colourful way of doing something quite orthodox’.52
So if we follow Lakatos, we need both internal and external history
in order to write a history of science (and we should only joke about
dismissing the latter into footnotes). What is important is that
internal history is constructed (or rationally reconstructed) on the
basis of external history. And even after this rational reconstruction
is completed, it is constantly revised and adjusted in the light of
external history. In this sense, it is clear that even for the most
vocal proponents of internal history like Lakatos, external history is
explanatorily prior to internal history.
5.2. Internal history as explanatorily prior
The more controversial claim is that internal history plays an import-
ant and indispensable role in explaining external history. This claim
is often associated with Lakatos and for good reasons. He claims that
writing external history presupposes internal history.53 Why?
Because ‘the most important problems of external history are
48 I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification’, 138, n. 40.
49 I. Lakatos, ‘History of science’, 91 – this is not a passing remark, but
the summary of the third of the threemain claims he argues for in this paper.
50 Ibid, 94.
51 Ibid, 105.
52 Alan Musgrave, ‘Facts and values in science studies’, in Roderick
Weir Home (ed.) Science under Scrutiny: The Place of History and
Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983), 49–80 at 66 – see also the
similarly charitable interpretation of James Robert Brown, The Rational
and the Social (London: Routledge, 1989), 109–111; Ian Hacking,
‘Lakatos’s philosophy of science’, 396; I. Hacking Representing and
Intervening, 125.
53 See e.g. Lakatos, ‘History of science’, 92, 105.
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defined by internal history’.54 Or, to use his tellingmetaphor, ‘the in-
ternal skeleton of rational history defines the external problems’.55
In other words, internal history is far from being the history
of science. It is only the skeleton of history of science and a lot of
work needs to be done to get from the skeleton to the full body of
history of science.56 Nonetheless, although internal history is
merely the skeleton of the history of science, it is necessary to have
this skeleton to build on. Internal history is a necessary ingredient
of any serious history of science.57
One may wonder why Lakatos takes internal history to be so
important. As Larry Laudan rightly points out, ‘Lakatos nowhere es-
tablishes the necessity (or the desirability) of making a reconstruction
of the past which involves an intentional warping of the historical
record’.58 He gives only one passing remark that could be construed
as an argument, which alludes to the fact that the aim here is to
explain the history of science, a largely rational social enterprise,
which needs to be kept separate from the history of other social phe-
nomena. In other words, it is in order to preserve the special status of
science that we need to use rational reconstructions. Doing without
rational reconstruction would make ‘scientific change a kind of reli-
gious change’.59 And this ‘would vindicate, no doubt unintention-
ally, the basic political credo of contemporary religious maniacs’.60
I want to argue for a version of the claim that Lakatos endorses,
namely, that internal history plays an indispensable role in explaining
external history, but without relying on the reasons he gives for this
claim. For Lakatos, it is only the external history of science that needs
to rely on internal history (understood, as we have seen, by him as the
growth of objective thought). So, for him, the external history of re-
ligion, for example, would not need to rely on internal history. I want
to part from Lakatos at this point. I will argue that internal history
plays an indispensable role in explaining external history not just
when it comes to the history of science, but any branches of history.
54 Ibid, 105, see also I. Lakatos, ‘A postscript’, 191 and Lakatos,
‘History of science’, 92 for similar formulations.
55 I. Lakatos, ‘A postscript’, 191.
56 See, e.g., I. Lakatos, ‘History of science’, 118, I. Lakatos, ‘A post-
script’, 191–192.
57 See I. Lakatos, ‘A postscript’, 192.
58 I. Laudan, Progress, 170.
59 I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification’, 93.
60 Ibid.
19
Internal History versus External History
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819117000067
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 78.23.194.138, on 15 Feb 2017 at 08:28:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
I want to give two considerations in favor of this claim. The first
one is about observable but unobserved events in external history.
As we have seen, external history is the sum total of all observable
events (at a certain place and time and of a certain type). And this in-
cludes not only those observable events that were observed, but also
those that happened not to be observed by anyone. If we are writing
the economic history of South-East Tanzania in the 1960s, some im-
portant elements of the external history will be trade agreements and
records of prices of crops, but the external economic history of South-
East Tanzania in the 1960s also encompasses those trade deals that we
have no record of. In general, historians are in the unfortunate pos-
ition that they never have a complete record of what happened. But
then how can they account for those events that there are no
records about?What can the historian say about observable but unob-
served events in external history?
My answer is that they can and often need to use internal history:
the series of unobservable events that stand in explanatory relation
to each other. On the basis of the documented trade deals in South-
East Tanzania in the 1960s, we can identify a pattern of economic
activities.61 But this pattern of economic activities would be some-
thing unobservable – it would amount to internal history. And on
the basis of these patterns – on the basis of internal history – we
can make inferences with regards to those economic activities that
we have no record of.
The second reason why internal history plays an indispensable role
in explaining external history has to do with the contrast classes of
historical explanations. Explanation is always contrastive: explaining
why x is F rather than G is a different explanatory task from explain-
ing why x, rather than y, is F.62 In other words, explanation is always
relative to a contrast class. I am assuming the same is true for histor-
ical explanations.
But then the question is what allows the historian to identify the
contrast class for her historical explanations. Which contrast classes
are worth taking into consideration and which are not? My answer
is that the contrast class of historical explanations comes from internal
history. And this is the sense in which internal history plays an indis-
pensable role in external history.
Here is an example. Many historians of biology have been trying to
explain why Darwin attributed so much importance to Henry
61 Felicitas Becker, Becoming Muslim in Mainland Tanzania (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008).
62 Van Fraassen, Scientific Image, 142–143.
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Charles Fleeming Jenkin’s objection to his theory of natural selec-
tion.63 Jenkin’s paper was published in 1867 and two years later,
Darwin wrote that ‘Fleeming Jenkin has given me much trouble,
but has been more real use to me than any other essay or review’.64
Jenkin’s objection about blending inheritance became perhaps the
most important criticism of The Origin of Species and even of the
theory of natural selection in general (before the ‘modern synthe-
sis’).65 Stated very simplistically, the objection is that natural selec-
tion cannot explain real evolutionary change since, because of the
‘blending’ nature of inheritance, variations from the average will be
watered down to be closer to the average in the next generation.
The question is: why did Darwin take Jenkin’s objection to be so
important?
How should the external historian begin to address this question?
The first thing they should do (and many historians in fact do) is to
see how good Jenkin’s objection really is and what aspect of
Darwin’s theory it jeopardized. The standard interpretation of
Jenkin’s objection is that it made it clear that Darwin was using amis-
taken theory of inheritance (the ‘blending’ theory) and as long as we
take inheritance to be blending the traits of the two parents, then
Jenkin is correct to point out that natural selection will not be able
63 Stephen Jay Gould, ‘Fleeming Jenkin revisited’ in Bully for
Brontosaurus (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 340–353; Michael
Bulmer, Francis Galton: Pioneer of Heredity and Biometry (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 141–145; Michael Bulmer, ‘Did
Jenkin’s swamping argument invalidate Darwin’s theory of natural selec-
tion?’, British Journal for the History of Science 37 (2004): 281–297; S. W.
Morris, ‘Fleeming Jenkin and The Origin of Species: A reassessment’,
British Journal for the History of Science 27 (1994): 313–343; Peter J.
Bowler, The Eclipse of Darwinism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1983); Peter J. Bowler, The Non-Darwinian Revolution:
Reinterpreting a Historical Myth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1988); Peter J. Bowler, Charles Darwin: The Man and his Influence
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); G. Cookson and
C. A. Hempstead, AVictorian Scientist and Engineer: Fleeming Jenkin and
the Birth of Electrical Engineering (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).
64 Letter to Joseph Hooker, in F. Darwin and A. C. Seward, More
Letters of Charles Darwin, 2 vols. (London: Murray, 1903, vol. 2), 379,
see also a similar claim in his letter to Alfred Russel Wallace also in 1869.
65 See David L. Hull,Darwin and His Critics. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1973) and P. Vorzimmer, ‘Charles Darwin and blending
inheritance’ Isis 54 (1963): 371–390; P. Vorzimmer, Charles Darwin, The
Years of Controversy: The Origin of Species and Its Critics, 1859–1882
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1970), for summaries.
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to explain major evolutionary change.66 This interpretation of
Jenkin’s argument is consistent with the textbook narrative of the sig-
nificance of the ‘modern synthesis’ that replaced Darwin’s original
concept of inheritance in the theory of natural selection with a
Mendelian one. Thus, Darwin was right to take Jenkin’s criticism
seriously.
But here is an alternative interpretation. ErnstMayr argues convin-
cingly that Jenkin’s paper is deeply confused and it does not present
any good objection.67 Mayr argues that Jenkin failed to grasp what is,
according to Mayr, the most important element of Darwin’s theory,
which he labels ‘population thinking’: the view that in the biological
domain individual variation cannot be ignored and subsumed
under some fixed and preexisting type. Individual variation is what
drives evolution and we can only talk about types that these variations
are instantiations of as statistical abstractions.68 Jenkin assumes that
variation is always variation within a type. According to Mayr, this
is an instance of the ‘typological thinking’ or essentialism that
Darwin was strongly opposed to. Thus, Mayr concludes, Jenkin mis-
understood the most important claim of the theory of natural selec-
tion. Darwin could have easily refuted him, but he didn’t. In other
words, Darwin was completely mistaken to take Jenkin’s criticism
seriously.69
We have two different historical explanations for Darwin’s assess-
ment of Jenkin’s argument. What matters for our purposes is not
which one is correct, but in what way they differ. They differ in as
much as they rely on different internal history of the Darwinian revo-
lution. And, as a result, the external historical narrative will also look
very different.
If we accept Mayr’s explanation and claim that Darwin was wrong
to take Jenkin’s criticism seriously, then we also need to interpret the
66 See, for example, R. C. Lewontin, ‘How important is genetics for an
understanding of evolution?’, American Zoologist 26 (1986): 811–820.
67 Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1982), 512–514, see also Philip Kitcher, Living
with Darwin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 73–75, who also
nicely exposes the racist undertones of Jenkin’s paper.
68 See especially ErnstMayr, ‘Typological versus population thinking’,
in B. J. Meggers (ed.) Evolution and Anthropology (Washington: The
Anthropological Society of America, 1959), 409–412, see also Elliott
Sober, ‘Evolution, population thinking, and essentialism’, Philosophy of
Science 47 (1980): 350–383, and Bence Nanay, ‘Population thinking as
trope nominalism’, Synthese 177 (2011): 91–109.
69 See especially E. Mayr, Growth, 514.
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related changes Darwinmade in later editions ofTheOrigin of Species
(especially on page 72 of the 1872 edition of The Origin of Species) as
insignificant.70 And if we accept his interpretation, then this sets the
agenda for future historical research: the next question the external
historian should ask is about why Darwin was so mistaken about
the vulnerability of his own theory in the face of Jenkin’s objection.
Mayr’s (sketchy) answer is that it is because he was ‘rather confused
on the topic of variation’.71
If, in contrast, we accept the standard narrative about Jenkin’s
criticism, then the changes Darwin made in the later editions will
be considered to be very significant indeed. The agenda for future
historical research will also look very different: the next step is
likely to involve the understanding of the reasons why Darwin was
mistaken about inheritance.
Crucially, what constitutes the difference between these two (exter-
nal) historical explanations is the way in which Darwin’s theory is
being ‘rationally reconstructed’ (as Lakatos would say). For Mayr,
the crucial element of this theory is population thinking. That is
why, according to Mayr, Darwin should have dismissed Jenkin’s ob-
jection without thinking twice about it. According to the standard in-
terpretation, however, Darwin’s mistaken ideas about inheritance are
part of the most central Darwinian claims (to be contrasted with the
correct ideas of the ‘modern synthesis’). Thus, the two historical ex-
planations differ in what they take to be the internal history of the
theory of evolution. And, as we have seen, depending on what we
take this internal history to be, we get different directions for
future (external) historical research. Further, depending on what
we take internal history to be, the course of external history, for
example, the change of Darwin’s thinking between the earlier and
the later editions of The Origin of Species, will also look different.
The aim of this brief case study was to show that internal history
plays an indispensable role in the writing of external history.
Mayr’s and the standard historical explanation differs in the assess-
ment of the internal history of Darwin’s theory, and, as a result, as
different questions about the influence of Jenkin’s criticism on
Darwin’s thinking. This means that they use different contrast
classes when they ask why Darwin took Jenkin’s criticism seriously.
Mayr asks why Darwin took it seriously, rather than just dismissed it
as a piece of old essentialist typological thinking. The standard
account asks why Darwin was forced to take Jenkin’s criticism
70 See, e.g. Vorzimmer, Charles Darwin.
71 E. Mayr, Growth, 514, see also ibid., 681–697.
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seriously, rather than having theory of inheritance that would not
have made his theory to be susceptible to it. As a result of this differ-
ence in the contrast classes the course of external history of the
Jenkin–Darwin episode (as well as the further questions it raises)
will also be very different.
6. Conclusion
I argued that internal history plays an indispensable explanatory role
in writing external history and external history also plays an indis-
pensable explanatory role in writing internal history. So the meta-
physical asymmetry between internal and external history is not
present in the explanatory domain. We should write internal
history on the basis of external history and we should write external
history on the basis of internal history.
Historians use internal and external history in a way that is not en-
tirely dissimilar to the way scientists use data and theory: they con-
struct theories on the basis of the data and then interpret the data
on the basis of the theory and also test the theory against new data,
giving rise to a cyclical reassessment of both the theory and the
data. Similarly, historians construct internal history on the basis of
external history and then interpret external history on the basis of in-
ternal history and also test internal history against external history,
which gives rise to a cyclical reassessment of both internal and exter-
nal history.72
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